As those of you who know me, or have followed the blog for a while, can guess, I am attracted to DQ’s account of Kant’s “new and severer legislation” because it captures the anti-psychologistic force of Kant’s work in logic and ethics. I take DQ to recognize that Kant’s logic eschews the psychological, does not trespass into (and tolerates no trespass from) psychology.
I find DQ’s remarks to suggest Bradley’s more direct comment: “We [English] have lived too long in the psychological attitude.” Bradley was thinking of logic, but he could also have been thinking about ethics.
DQ’s remark about ethics puzzles me though, after I have read past its praiseworthy anti-psychologistic force. Is eudaimonism psychologistic? Centralizing moral psychology need not commit anyone to being psychologistic, since part of the point could be to undo the psychologizing of moral psychology. –Just a thought or two.