Another entry in the Bradley Calvacade:
I am afraid that, when some readers hear a poor ‘ontologist’ like myself uttering warning cries about the limits of our knowledge, they will think of Satan mighty in the scriptures or rebuking sin. And yet I feel bound to submit to their attention that very rule which made me an ontologist, still keeps, and will keep me one: Where you find a puzzle you are making an assumption, and it is your duty to find out what that assumption is.
What should we make of this rule? In context, I believe the right way to understand it is to situate it against Kant’s Antinomies, or, relatedly, against Ramsey’s maxim. Let me use the latter:
It is a heuristic maxim that the truth lies not in one of two disputed views, but in some third possibility which has not yet been thought of, and which we only discover by rejecting something assumed as obvious by the two disputants.
Ramsey’s maxim, forcefully economized (and internalized) as Bradley’s Rule, shapes the whole of Appearance and Reality–and indeed the whole of Bradley’s work.
The anti-Augustinian property colors metaphilosophy: when someone asks how to do philosophy, we know, but when no one asks (and we are doing it), we do not know. Philosophical ‘practice’ can seem impermeable to metaphilosophical ‘theory’. All too often, in the throes of the problems, our metaphilosophy reduces to ornamental chatter. It bears no load. But not in Bradley. He keeps his rules–he walks his talk’s walk.