Merleau-Ponty on Perception

Nothing is more foreign to perception therefore than the idea of a universe which would produce in us representations which are distinct from it by means of a causal action. To speak Kantian language, the realism of naïve consciousness is an empirical realism—the assurance of an external experience in which there is no doubt about escaping ‘states of consciousness’ and acceding to solid objects—and not a transcendental realism which, as a philosophical thesis, would posit these objects as the ungraspable causes of ‘representations’ which alone are given.

4 responses

  1. IOW, what you see is what you get. Why do these philosophers have to make things sound so complicated? 🙂

  2. Well, doesn’t Hegel say, almost proto-Wittgenstenian, we say ‘This’ house here, and when we turn, ‘This’ tree. What is ‘This’? Seems like a concept that isn’t changing and through which we get the tree or house…. right?

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