Cavell notes that in Part IV of The Claim of Reason PI had shifted for him from object of interpretation to means of interpretation. I mention this because of my growing sense of how much of the blog has been devoted to trying to say something about the importance of PI, to reveal something of what and how it is central in my life, and I am chagrined by the error of each trial. Nonetheless, I continue, even as I fail to satisfy myself in treating PI as an object of interpretation, —I continue unabashedly to use it as a means, even as my primary mean, of interpretation. That impresses me now as mysterious. Is it because I am convinced by the rightness of PI beyond my ability to articulate that rightness? But how should I understand that inarticulate conviction? Can it be trusted? Or is it rather that my conviction of its rightness is itself justified for me by my repetitiously endured inability to articulate that rightness, as if being able to articulate it would demote PI from its position as standard for me, so that success would be a form of self-defeat? Or is it rather because my conviction is that PI requires itself to withstand all of its own judgments, understands itself both as supplying and suffering its own terms of criticism, making itself simultaneously object and source of philosophical criticism? Or is it rather because only what shows itself as a faithful means of interpretation is surely worth the difficulty of interpreting?