Near the beginning of “Other Minds I”, Wisdom makes a distinction between two sources of doubt about other people’s states of mind. I will not now take up that distinction; I will come back to it soon. Wisdom notes that his attention was drawn to the need to make the distinction by Wittgenstein. And Wisdom takes this mention of Wittgenstein’s name as an opportunity to say something about his debt to Wittgenstein:
How much in this paper is due to Wittgenstein will be appreciated only by people who have listened to him. My debt to him is enormous and is no means to be measured by the few places where I happen to mention that such and such a point come from him or put a W. against an example of his. At the same time I do not think my way of doing things would quite meet with his approval–it’s not sufficiently hard working–a bit cheap and flash.
I make no apology for mentioning this sort of point. For this is the sort of criticism of philosophical work which I find appropriate. Those who deplore so ‘personal’ an attitude and say, “Who cares whether so and so likes what is said, wheat we want to know is whether it is true”, emphasise the objectivity of philosophy to the point of turning it into a science. I remember with what relish I once heard McTaggert say in a discussion, “What we want to know is not why he said it but what reason he had for saying it”, But I didn’t then realise how near to reasons are some causes which aren’t reasons and how beside the point are many reasons.
I want to spend some time thinking about Wisdom’s sort of philosophical criticism. I will begin doing so tomorrow or Friday.